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1. Introduction 
It has been widely observed that throughout the world, during the decade of 
the 1970s, the capital ratios of banks in developed economies declined precipitously. 
In an attempt to reverse this decline, banks regulators issued guidelines on capital 
standards for banks (and bank holding companies, as in the United States) in 
December 1981. These standards required banks to hold a fixed percentage of their 
assets as capital. Although these minimum regulatory standards have been given 
credit for arresting deterioration in bank capital levels, the 1980s witnessed a 
significant number of bank failures and a massive downturn in US stock markets in 
1987 (the “black Monday”).  As a consequence, the rationale for the stipulation of 
fixed capital to asset ratio was called into question. Research by Alfriend (1988) 
around that time also confirmed that a weakness of the minimum standards was that 
they failed to acknowledge the heterogeneity of bank assets, and as a result, the bank 
had an incentive to shift their portfolios towards high-risk assets.  
In response to these developments, the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision (BCBS) announced the adoption of risk-based capital standards in July 
1988. The objectives of the standards were not only to strengthen the international 
banking system, but also to promote convergence of national capital standards, 
thereby ironing out competitive inequalities among banks across countries. The 1988 
Basel agreement was designed to apply to internationally active banks of member 
countries of the BCBS with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) at Basel, 
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Switzerland, but the nitty gritties of its implementation were left to national 
discretion.
4  
The reasons for the primarily G-10 centric structure of the institution of the 
1988 Accord are not far to seek. First, over 80 per cent of global banking assets rest 
with banks incorporated in these countries. Therefore, the focus of banking systems 
in these countries would need to be a priority agenda. Second, with state-of-the-art 
information technology being used by banks in these countries, it was believed that a 
pro-active approach to banking supervision in these countries would necessarily 
stave off any failures and also address the dangers of contagion stemming there 
from. While these facts might have had a fair degree of credibility in an autarkic 
world, the inference may not be as sacrosanct at present. Moreover, the way in which 
the minimum capital ratio of 8 per cent was incorporated in regulatory regimes 
varied across countries, with countries applying several variants of the basic 
standards. The impact of the 1988 Accord rapidly diffused beyond the original G-10 
countries and by 1999, it formed part of the regime of prudential regulation not only 
for internationally active, but also for domestic banking systems in more than 100 
countries (BIS, 1999). 
From the very beginning, the 1988 Accord was subject to criticism, which 
was hardly surprising in view of the fact that the agreement had to accommodate 
banking practices and regulatory regimes in countries with varied legal systems, 
business norms and prevalent institutional structures. Criticisms were mainly directed 
at its failure to make adequate allowance for the degree of reduction in risk exposure 
achievable through diversification and at its arbitrary and non-discriminatory 
calibration of certain credit risks. Illustratively, a credit to a blue chip corporate was 
treated in the same fashion as a loan to a lesser-known financial company. The 
uniform weight attributed in almost all circumstances to private borrowers, 
regardless of their creditworthiness was considered an incentive to regulatory 
arbitrage, under which banks were tempted to exploit the opportunities afforded by 
the Accord’s classification of risk exposure to increase their holding of high-yielding, 
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but also high-risk assets for a given level of regulatory capital. However, recurring 
crises over the past two decades in both the developed and developing world have 
provided graphic evidence of the fact that, given the globalisation and univeralization 
of banking operations, the onset of banking crises can impact the banking systems in 
both the home and host countries in equal measure through contagion effects. Since 
banking crises are difficult to predict accurately and can have devastating effects on 
the macro-economy (Goldstein et al., 2000), proactive supervision of banks in 
developed economies while necessary, is not sufficient to prevent failures. Thus, with 
both international and domestic banking systems coming increasingly under the 
same regulatory umbrella and the growing interest in adoption of international 
standards being shown by the non G-10 countries, the distinction between 
‘internationally active’ versus ‘domestic’ banks, on the one hand, and ’sophisticated’ 
versus ‘less sophisticated’ banks, on the other, tends to have limited relevance than in 
the past (Narain and Ghosh, 2003).  
It is in this context that, against the light of the historical backdrop of the 
1988 Accord, the present paper focuses on the New Basel Capital Accord, its 
objective, the building blocks and the concerns expressed about the same. The 
discussion unfolds as follows. A historical backdrop of the New Basel Capital 
Accord and its broad contours is given in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the 
possible implications of the New Basel Capital Accord for India from the standpoint 
of the emerging market economies. Section 4 develops a simple empirical model to 
examine the factors influencing capital position of banks in India. Apart from 
presenting the concluding observations, the last section also attempts a prognosis of 
the future scenario vis-à-vis the New Basel Accord.  
2.  The New Basel Capital Accord: Genesis and Major Features 
The 1988 Accord reflected a consensus of the member countries of BIS as to 
the proportions in which various suitable financial instruments could be permitted to 
be part of the banks’ capital base. Three basic categories of capital could be 
purported to serve these purposes: debt capital, equity capital and hybrid capital 
(which combines features of equity and debt). There existed wide divergence in 
market and regulatory practices among Basel member countries regarding which   4
instruments could be considered for possible inclusion in the three basic forms of 
capital. Accordingly, the solution adopted for the 1988 Accord involved 
distinguishing between two tiers: tier I (comprising equity shares, disclosed reserves 
and capital reserves) and tier II (comprising less pure forms of capital like hybrid 
debt instruments, subordinated debt and undisclosed reserves); tier II capital in the 
aggregate was limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of tier I capital. The pattern of 
risk weights on assets was accordingly specified, linking the capital position of banks 
to its risk-weighted assets. The ratio, thus arrived, was not to fall below 8 per cent.  
In the years following the 1988 Accord, it was subject to amendments 
intended to refine and extend its treatment of banks’ exposure to credit risk and the 
list of eligible instruments for inclusion in capital. For example, the 1996 Amendment 
to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market Risks accommodates two alternative ways of 
measuring minimum levels of capital for market risks: one based on banks’ own 
internal risk- measurement models and the other on a standardised methodology 
under which capital requirements are estimated separately for different categories of 
market risk and then summed to give an overall capital charge. 
As the reform of banking regulation became an important policy agenda of 
developing and transition economies (a tendency given impetus by the East-Asian 
financial crisis), the appropriateness of the Basel standards to such economies 
became a subject of debate. Inter alia, the question was raised as to whether 
economies vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and with fragile financial sectors 
necessitated a more stringent standard than the 8 per cent ratio. At the same time, 
financial sector stability assessment came to dominate the policy agenda of 
international agencies with the health of the banking sector and the overall capital 
position becoming a matter of prime focus. The Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (BIS, 1997) emphasised the need for banking supervisors to set minimum 
capital requirements for banks in order to adequately reflect the risks undertaken by 
banks and simultaneously the need to define the components of capital bearing in 
mind banks’ ability to absorb losses. While such developments were underway, it was 
increasingly realised that in addition to credit risk (which was the preponderant focus 
of the 1988 Accord), the growing complexity of banking operations and the move   5
towards a market-driven financial sector in the aftermath of financial liberalisation 
across large parts of the globe (Williamson and Mahar, 1998) brought to the fore 
other forms of risks, such as liquidity risk, market risks and operational risks.  
The proposals in the BIS document A New Capital Adequacy Framework began 
in the aftermath of the turbulence in financial markets which followed the Russian 
Government’s forced restructuring of its own short-term debt and its moratorium 
on the servicing of a wide range of private sector external obligations in August 1998 
and the rescue operation of the Long-Term Hedge Fund, which followed in the 
autumn (Fleming, 1999).  
The objectives of the New Basel Capital Accord, as enunciated by the BIS 
are five-fold: (a) promoting safety and soundness of the financial system; (b) enhance 
competitive equality; (c) comprehensive approach to addressing risks; (d) greater 
sensitivity to he degree of risk involved in banks’ activities; and (e) focus on 
internationally active banks, with the capability of being applicable to banks with 
varying levels of complexity and sophistication (BIS, 2001). 
In view of these factors, the Basel Committee proposed a New Capital 
Adequacy Framework (hereafter referred to as the “The New Basel Capital Accord” or 
“new Accord”) in June 1999 incorporating three major elements or “pillars”: 
minimum capital requirements, based on weights intended to be more closely aligned to 
economic risks than the 1988 Accord, supervisory review, which set basic standards for 
bank supervision to minimize regulatory arbitrage and market discipline, which 
envisages greater levels of disclosure and standards of transparency by the banking 
system. After the first proposal of June 1999, there were two subsequent consultative 
packages, released in 2001 and 2003. Finally, on 26 June 2004 the central bank 
governors of the G10 countries endorsed the revised framework for the 
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, 
commonly known as the new Basel Capital Accord or “Basel II”. This endorsement 
represented the culmination of a challenging project that was carried out by BCBS 
and its member institutions over an extended period spanning more than five years. 
The revised Framework has been designed to provide options for banks and banking 
systems, for determining the capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk   6
and enables banks / supervisors to select approaches that are most appropriate for 
their operations and financial markets. The Framework is expected to promote 
adoption of stronger risk management practices in banks (BIS, 2004; Caruana, 2004). 
The specific purpose of the new Basel Accord was to address major 
shortcomings of the current framework for capital requirements. Towards this end, 
the new Accord introduces greater sophistication for measuring credit risk capital 
requirements, in line with current best practices among banks. Furthermore, the new 
framework aims to reduce the scope for “capital arbitrage” and to make more 
accurate provision for the effect of risk mitigation measures. In addition, the revised 
framework introduces a capital charge for operational risk as well as comprehensive 
requirements for market disclosure. Finally, the scope for supervisory action is 
extended, as supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their 
capital needs relative to their risks, and to intervene if needed.  
The revised framework aims to safeguard banks’ safety and soundness and to 
increase the stability of the financial system as a whole. In order to achieve this, the 
BCBS has provided the new capital adequacy framework with a structure that 
strengthens incentives for prudent bank management. It also envisages bank 
supervisors being directly involved in validating a bank’s measurement of risk and in 
assigning a capital buffer. Finally, by introducing disclosure requirements, it creates 
an environment in which market participants have better access to information on 
risks in individual banking organisations and, on this basis, they can exert more 
effective market discipline. There is, therefore, a “feedback loop” running from 
market assessment (pillar 3) to the credit weighting structure (pillar 1) which is to be 
monitored through the supervisory review of capital adequacy (pillar 2). 
This comprehensive approach responds to the need for better risk control by 
aligning regulatory capital to risk-based economic capital. The stability of the banking 
sector will therefore be enhanced by increased alignment of capital requirements 
with the risks taken by individual banks.  Moreover, the incentive to develop or 
improve a tailored risk management function within the individual banking 
organisations will foster efficiency and stability within the system.  The active role for 
supervisory authorities will encourage banks to further develop their risk 
management functions, while market participants will have sufficient information to   7
adequately assess the risks, performance and overall capital adequacy of an 
institution. 
Much of the concern about the New Basel Capital Accord comes from the 
first pillar of minimum capital requirements. As per the January 2001 Consultative 
Paper (BIS, 2001), banks can choose from the following three evolutionary variants 
to measure the risks, viz., (a) a basic standardized model (modified version of the 
existing approach), (b) an internal rating based (IRB) foundation model, and (c) an 
advanced IRB model. While the basic standardized model is based on the ratings of 
the external rating agencies like Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s, a basic requirement 
for the foundation or advanced IRB model is to develop the Bank’s own internal 
rating system. It may be noted that depending on which model is chosen the capital 
requirement will vary. This has important implications for the emerging market 
economies. 
Furthermore, as far as the minimum capital requirement of a Bank is 
concerned, it needs to be noted that the New Accord makes a distinction between 
credit risk, market risk and operational risk, so that, regulatory capital is sum of 
capital requirement on account of these three risks. The definition of capital in the 
New Basel Capital Accord has been retained unchanged from that of the original 
Accord.
5 
Much of the discussion stimulated by the New Basel Capital Accord has 
focused on its standardised approach to the risk weighting of different elements 
among the assets of banking books. This is because of the proposed reliance on 
external credit assessment institutions in delineating risk weights. The calibration of 
sovereign risk weights is considerably finer than that of the 1988 Accord; with the 
highest risk weight allowed being 150 per cent, instead of 100 per cent as in the 1988 
Accord. 
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The New Accord puts forward two alternative options for the risk-weighting 
of banks. The first would be linked to the weighting attributed to the country in 
which the bank is incorporated. The weight attributed to the bank would be one 
category less favourable than that applying to the country (Table 1; option 1). 
However, there would be a ceiling of 100 per cent on the weights for exposures to 
banks of all but the lowest rated countries, for which the ceiling would be 150 per 
cent. The second option would involve recourse to external agencies own ratings of 
banks. Under this option, claims on banks with a rating of AA- or better would be 
assigned the lowest risk weight, which increases gradually as the sovereign rating of 
the country declines. Under this option (unlike the first), inter-bank claims would 
also be differentiated by their maturity, but the benchmark for such differentiation 
has been tightened from a residual maturity of upto 1 year (in the 1988 Accord) to an 
original  maturity of upto 6 months (in the New Basel Capital Accord).  
Table 1: Risk-weights of the New Basel Capital Accord:  
Exemplified with Standard and Poor’s Rating 
 











Sovereign   0  20  50  100  150  100 
              
  Banks      Option 1a  20 50 100 100 150  100 
      Option 2b  20 50  50  100 150  50c 
              
Corporates   20  100  100  100  150  100 
a: risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign in which the bank is incorporated 
b: risk weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank 
c: claims of a short original maturity les than six months on banks with a rating above BB+ would 
receive a weighting that is one category more favourable than the usual risk weight on the bank’s 
claims subject to a floor of 20 per cent or the level of the risk weight applying to its country of 
incorporation. 
Source: BIS (2001) 
 
The weights in the new framework also provide for differentiation in the case 
of non-financial corporates to recognise variations in their credit quality. 
Illustratively, a weight of 20 per cent is attributed to entities with credit rating of AA-
or better (subject to the proviso that no corporate should receive a weight lower than 
that of its country of incorporation); corporates with rating below B- would be   9
assigned 150 per cent risk weight. Other changes in the standardised approach 
concern the weights for off-balance sheet items and treatment of securitised assets.  
 
The IRB Approach 
The IRB framework for corporates, sovereign and bank exposures build on 
current best practice in credit risk measurement and management. While, the 
standardized approach is, in principle, close to the existing arrangement, under the 
IRB approach, banks will be allowed to use their internal estimates of borrowers’ 
credit worthiness, subject to supervisory validation.
6 Under the IRB approach, Banks 
will be required to classify banking book exposures into the six broad classes of 
assets which underlie different credit risk characteristics viz., (a) Corporate, (b) Bank, 
(c) Sovereign, (d) Retail, (e) Project finance, and (f) Equity. For the fist three types of 
exposures, the Committee has developed both foundation and advanced 
methodologies for the estimation of risk components (there is no distinction 
between foundation and advanced methodologist in the retail framework). For 
corporate, bank, sovereign, and retail risks, there is a specific set of risk weights. For 
each of these classifications, exposure risk weights are derived from the specific 
continuous foundation risk weighted asset is defined as the product of risk weight of 
transaction and a measure of exposure (Box 1).  
Box I:  Internal ratings-based approach 
The approach of the new Accord to credit risk measurement represents a significant 
step forward in banking regulation because it combines practical applicability with a 
solid theoretical foundation. Given that the new methodology is suitable for 
implementation by banks of different sizes, business structures and risk profiles, a 
common approach to modelling credit risk across all types of bank is available for 
regulatory purposes for the first time. The internal ratings-based approach (IRB) is 
closely linked to key results of modern asset pricing theory. Its methodology is based 
on a model which establishes the likelihood of a borrowing company being unable to 
repay its debt, as determined by the difference between the value of its assets and the 
nominal value of its debt. The value of the firm’s assets is modelled as a variable 
which changes over time, in part as a result of the impact of random shocks. Default 
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is assumed to occur when a firm’s assets are insufficient to cover its debt. The 
corresponding measure of credit risk within a certain time frame (commonly set at 
one year) is the probability of default (Gordy, 2003)  
In the IRB approach, the required minimum capital is based on the distribution of 
losses due to default in a portfolio of loans or similar instruments. The horizon of 
the risk assessment is set at one year. The IRB model further assumes a 99.9% 
confidence level. This means that once in a thousand years, the actual loss is 
expected to exceed the model’s estimate. In addition, as a result of the agreement 
reached by the BCBS in January 2004, the IRB capital requirements cover only 
unexpected losses, i.e. losses which are not covered by provisions.  The calculation 
of capital requirements for a loan’s default risk under the new Accord relies on six 
components: 
Probability of default (PD): estimate of the likelihood of the borrower defaulting on its 
obligations within a given horizon, e.g. one year. 
Loss given default (LGD): loss on the loan following default on the part of the 
borrower, commonly expressed as a percentage of the debt’s original nominal value. 
Exposure at default (EAD): nominal value of the borrower’s debt. 
Maturity of the loan. 
Correlation to systematic risk: estimate of the link between the joint default of two 
separate borrowers. The IRB model relies on a single-factor asset value model to 
describe the co-movement of defaults in a portfolio. The unobservable common 
factor can be interpreted as a variable which represents the state of the economic 
cycle. IRB correlations to the single systematic risk factor are a function of the firm’s 
size and credit quality in accordance  with the BCBS framework. 
Risk weight function: function relating the loss forecast to minimum capital 
requirements; 
The new Accord recognizes the importance of asset type in explaining the risk 
profile of instruments subject to default risk and therefore distinguishes between 
corporate loans, commercial real estate financing and the retail portfolio. The model 
assumes very low concentration in the loan portfolio and that an individual 
borrower’s default risk does not depend on the composition of the entire portfolio. 
This characteristic of the IRB considerably reduces the complexity of the approach 
and also allows smaller, less sophisticated banks to apply a modern risk management 
concept. 
Source: ECB Bulletin, January 2005 
 
Supervisory Review Process 
The second pillar of the New Basel Accord focuses on improving the 
supervisory review process and views the role of supervisory review as a critical 
complement to capital requirement and market discipline. It emphasises that, despite   11
improving the risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements, supervisors need 
to take a comprehensive view on how banks handle their risk management and 
internal capital allocation process. Subject to shortcomings in these, supervisors 
could require higher than the minimum capital target from a given institution.   
The discussion is concerned primarily with the application of the following 
four principles: (a) supervisors expect banks to operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital ratios and should be able to require banks to hold capital in excess 
of the minimum; (b) a bank should have a process for assessing its overall capital 
adequacy in relation to its risk profile, as well as a strategy for maintaining its capital 
levels; (c) supervisors should review and evaluate a bank’s internal capital adequacy 
assessment and strategy, as well as its compliance with regulatory capital ratios; and 
(d) supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from 
falling below prudent levels. 
 
Market Discipline 
The potential of market discipline to reinforce capital regulation depends on 
the disclosure of reliable and timely information with a view to enabling banks 
counterparties to make well-founded risk assessments. An important rationale 
behind this pillar is to provide adequate information to enable the user to assess 
whether the available capital is sufficient to meet measured and non-measured risks. 
To the extent that such disclosures are comprehensive and objective, it is expected to 
assist market participants in judging how a bank’s management of its capital 
adequacy relates to its other risk management process and its ability to withstand 
future volatility. The BIS has recently elaborated the recommendations of the New 
Basel Capital Accord concerning the nature of information which should be 
disclosed under this pillar. Salient among these include (i) the structure and 
components of bank capital, (ii) the terms and main features of its capital 
instruments, (iii) the accounting policies used in the valuation of assets and liabilities 
and for provisioning and income recognition, (iv) qualitative and quantitative 
information about its risk exposures and its strategies for risk management, (v) its 
capital ratio and other data related to its capital adequacy on a consolidated basis, and   12
(vi) a breakdown of its risk exposures. The information needs to be supplemented by 
an analysis of factors affecting the banks’ capital position. Moreover, banks are 
encouraged to disclose ways in which they allocate capital among their different 
activities. The disclosures envisaged under this pillar need to be made on a semi-
annual basis. 
The Third Consultative Document 
In the light of the comments received on the second consultative paper, the 
BIS issued the Third Consultative Document in April 2003. As compared to the 
Second Consultative document, the salient differences in the revised document 
pertain to, among others, applicability of advanced and foundation IRB approaches 
for commercial real estate lending, alternative approach to operational risk and 
lowering of risk weights on lending that is fully secured by mortgages on residential 
property.  
What are the salient features of the third consultative document? As far as 
the Pillar 1 is concerned it was mentioned that at national discretion, banks will be 
able to risk weight all corporate claims at 100 per cent without regard to external 
ratings. There is a new section on the treatment of past due loans (other than 
mortgages). Risk weights 150 per cent or 100 per cent was added dependent on 
whether specific provisions cover more or less than 20 per cent of outstanding loans. 
Furthermore, it was pointed out that a credit conversion factor of 100 per cent 
would be applied to the lending of banks’ securities or the posting of securities as 
collateral by banks, including repo. Besides, back-testing requirements for use of 
VaR are set out and PD floor of 0.03 per cent introduced for retail PD. Finally, it 
was pointed out that At national discretion, a bank can use an Alternative 
Standardised Approach (footnote 91 of BIS, 2003). For the retail and commercial 
banking business lines, the regulators are proposing an index other than Gross 
Income.  
In case of Supervisory Review Process also, a new section has been added 
identifying important issues that banks and supervisors should particularly focus on. 
It was mentioned that a bank should ensure that it has sufficient capital to meet Pillar 
1 requirements and the results of Pillar 1 stress tests. Supervisors were allowed to: (a)   13
assess banks’ application of the reference definition of default and its impact on 
capital requirements, (b) increase the capital required-to prevent “cherry picking” 
(where the poorer quality assets and most of the credit risk of the underlying 
exposures remains with the bank). 
As far as market discipline is concerned the Committee observed that 
considerable efforts have been made to ensure that the disclosure requirements of 
the New Basel Capital Accord focus on capital adequacy, and do not conflict with 
broader accounting disclosure standards with which banks need to comply. 
3.  Implications of the New Basel Capital Accord 
3.1 Possible Implications for Emerging Market Economies  
What is the likely impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on developing and 
/or emerging markets?
7 One of main arguments about the effect of the Basel Accord 
II on the developing and / or emerging market economies rests on the postulate that 
the bulk of the borrowers in these countries fall under the speculative grade. In 
particular, it has been argued that speculative-grade borrowers will suffer from a 
dramatic rise in debt costs and heightened cyclicality of global bank credit as a result 
of The New Basel Capital Accord (Reisen, 2001). If the ‘internal ratings-based’ 
approach suggested is implemented, then there will be a substantial rise in risk 
weights. By contrast, the ‘standardised’ approach, which links risk weights to ratings 
by eligible external credit assessment institutions, would leave banks’ regulatory 
capital charges, risk-adjusted returns and hence required spreads largely unchanged 
(except for the very lowest rating notches). Thus, to the extent it increases the capital 
requirement of the banks, it might have adverse repercussions on the credit 
portfolios of the banking sector.
8 
From a developing country perspective, the OECD / non-OECD distinction 
in risk-weights in Basel I is somewhat arbitrary and   provides a distorting incentive 
for developing countries to seek OECD membership (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 
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2001). Most importantly, the lower (20 per cent) risk-weights attached to short-term 
loans for emerging markets created a bias in their favour; on the other hand, credit to 
non-OECD banks with over one year maturity was discouraged by a far higher (100 
per cent) risk weight. The removal of the OECD/non-OECD distinction under the 
New Basel Capital Accord is likely to have negative consequences for lowly-rated 
OECD countries. Countries like Mexico, may find that the conditions attached to 
loans more closely reflect their actual rating rather than the fact of their OECD 
membership. Conversely, highly rated non-OECD countries (such as Chile) are likely 
to benefit from more favourable terms. Thus, the alterations to the current treatment 
of maturity should remove some of the incentives towards short-term lending to 
banks rated below AA-. Consequently, it might lengthen the aggregate maturity of 
such lending. Overall, however, as a result of the New Basel Capital Accord capital 
requirements could align better with actual risk. This could benefit the highly rated 
sovereigns, banks and corporates regardless of OECD membership.  
Developing countries have high concentration of lower rated borrowers. The 
calibration of IRB has lesser incentives to lend to such borrowers. This, along with 
withdrawal of uniform risk weight of 0% on sovereign claims may result in overall 
reduction in lending by internationally active banks in developing countries and 
increase their cost of borrowing.  
One of the major critiques of the New Basel Accord is perhaps the adoption 
of internal rating based (IRB) system. Two allegations are made in particular. First, 
that the application of IRB is costly and discriminates against the smaller banks, and 
secondly, that it will exacerbate cyclical fluctuations.  
Theoretical models have demonstrated that if the bank is capital constrained, 
then the New Basel Capital Accord will intensify the difference in bank lending rates 
and in bank loans between corporate borrowers with different probabilities of 
default (Chen, 2002) or make the entire banking system worse off, if all of them 
attempt to raise capital simultaneously from the capital market (Hellmann et. al, 2001). 
This is especially so in case such markets are not sufficiently deep and liquid, which 
is more often the case in developing economies.  
Discrimination against the Smaller Banks   15
A major impact of the New Accord could be an increase in the quantity of 
loans to borrowers rated above BBB and a fall in loans to borrowers rated below 
BBB (Griffith-Jones and Spratt, 2001). Given that the majority of the latter kind of 
borrowers are likely to be in the developed world, one major impact on the 
developing world will be a reduction in overall levels of lending from internationally 
active banks. What lending does occur is therefore likely to be concentrated in highly 
rated sovereigns, corporates and banks. In fact, as pointed out in Jackson (2001), for 
any bank, the effect of the internal ratings approach on required capital will depend 
on the risk profile of its particular book - high risk books will demand more capital 
than allotted currently and low risk books less (see, for instance, Nachane et al., 
2005).  
Pro-cyclicality  
One of the most significant charges leveled against the New proposals is that 
they will exacerbate pro-cyclicality in their lending since the substantially increased 
provisions which can result from deteriorations in loan quality in cyclical downturns 
can lead to greater restrictiveness regarding New lending (European Central Bank, 
2001; Ghosh and Nachane, 2003). In the case of an economic downswing if capital 
requirement becomes a constraint, then the bank may shrink its credit disbursement 
in an excessive way. Thus, it may exacerbate the recession / economic slowdown via 
the Fisherian debt-deflation spiral. Another important potential source of more pro-
cyclical bank lending which might result from the New Accord is the reliance on 
credit rating agencies in setting risk weights under the standardised approach to 
credit risk. This is one of the reservations expressed about reliance on credit rating 
agencies. Others concern the limited coverage of the ratings of existing agencies, the 
difficulty in establishing guidelines that would assure high quality of rating agencies 
and the closely related problem of incentives provided by the New Basel Capital 
Accord for the proliferation of new agencies and the likelihood of use of unsolicited 
credit ratings. 
Furthermore, when the risk-profiles of the lenders are assessed on the basis 
of an internal rating, the elements of pro-cyclicality are going to be higher still.  In   16
fact, Danielsson et al (2001) has interpreted this pro-cyclicality of regulation as an 
inherent conflict between regulation and macro-economic stabilization. 
Such elements of pro-cyclicity are inherent even in the existing Accord. 
There is however, the fear that greater risk sensitivity under New Basel Accord will 
aggravate this tendency. The drive for risk-weights to more accurately reflect PD is 
inherently pro-cyclical in that, during an upturn, average PD will fall - and thus 
incentives to lend will increase. Conversely, during a downturn, average PD will 
increase and, as a consequence, a credit crunch may develop with all but the most 
highly rated borrowers facing difficulty in attracting funds. The Basel Committee has 
recognised this concern, but argued that it would be outweighed by the benefits of a 
risk-sensitive capital framework. A strong piece of evidence against procyclicality 
comes from the European Central Bank. Employing a hypothetical portfolio of loans 
to 6,000 large, non-financial EU firms covering a long time span stretching from 
1992-2004 revealed two important observations. First, First, banks’ regulatory capital 
requirements under the IRB approach remain below the stipulated 8% for the 
hypothetical portfolio. And importantly, the new Accord will dampen pro-cyclicality 
features if the IRB is implemented as envisaged.  
 
 
Impact on International Capital Flows  
  A basic aim of the New Basel Capital Accord is to ensure that the regulatory 
capital of the international banks should be in alignment with the credit quality of 
their loan portfolio. Thus, for lending to low quality borrowers capital charges are 
likely to be higher.   This had led some commentators to argue that the resultant risk 
sensitivity would lead to a curtailment of supply of capital to emerging economies.  
There are two channels through which The New Basel Capital Accord could 
affect the supply of capital to the emerging markets, (a) cross-border flows to such 
markets, and (b) credit flows within such markets. As far as the cross-border flows 
are concerned, because of the withering away of the distinction between OECD and 
non-OECD countries, it is clear that the regulatory capital for low-rated OECD   17
countries (like Turkey) would rise (Hayes and Saporta, 2002). Similarly, the average 
regulatory minimum to low credit quality countries is also likely to go up. If such 
additional regulatory requirement imposes a capital constraint higher than the 
economic capital of the banks, then the credit flows to the emerging markets could 
be affected adversely. As far as the credit flows within emerging markets are 
concerned, if most of banks of the emerging markets adopt the standardized 
approach, it would be unaffected.       
     How far do these conjectures get translated in terms of calculations of credit 
risk?  While both Reisen (2001) and Griffiths Jones and Spratt (2001) predict 
dramatic increases in spreads for the low-rated countries, Weder and Wedow (2002) 
found that such increases in spreads is found to be rather low. Using the November 
(2001) version of The New Basel Capital Accord, and the S&P rating as of 
December 2001, the capital requirement for India is found to be unaltered at 8 per 
cent under both Basel I and the New Basel Capital Accord (standardized approach). 
The requirement under IRB approach (using a one year PD) was, in fact, found to be 
lower at 6.15 per cent!  While the scenario for India is found to be reasonably bright, 
for countries like Venezuela or Russia the difference in the capital requirement 
between the standardized approach and the IRB approach is rather large.  
  While this may not have any immediate concern for India, it is a fact that the 
credit flows do become more sensitive to the external credit ratings. In is in this 
context, that the comment of the RBI about the undesirability of unsolicited external 
credit agencies needs to be taken all the more seriously, so that international capital 
flows via the banking channels are not subjected to the vagaries of international 
rating arbitrage.       
3.2  Implications for India 
The New Basel Capital Accord has evoked diverse reactions from various 
groups of economies.
9 As far as India’s reactions are concerned, the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI), in its comments on the Second Consultative Document, pointed out that The 
New Basel Capital Accord would involve a shift in direct supervisory focus away to 
                                                 
9 See Nachane et al (2005) for a discussion on the reaction of developing countries to the new 
Accord.   18
the implementation issues, and that banks and the supervisors would be required to 
invest large resources in upgrading their technology and human resources to meet 
the minimum standards.  It came down rather heavily on the increasing reliance on 
external rating agencies in the regulatory process on the ground that such a move 
would undermine the initiative of banks in enhancing their risk management policies 
and practices and internal control systems. It found that the minimum standards for 
the Internal Rating Based (IRB) foundation approach to be complex and beyond the 
reach of many banks. Further, while the Basel Committee desires neither to produce 
a net increase nor a net decrease in minimum regulatory capital, it is felt that the 
current proposals are going to result in significant increase in the capital charge for 
banks, especially in emerging markets. The emerging markets with their low technical 
skills, structural rigidities and less robust legal system, etc. would face serious 
implementation challenges.  RBI felt that that the spirit of flexibility, universal 
applicability and discretion to national supervisors, consistent with the macro 
economic conditions specific to emerging markets ought to be preserved while 
finalizing the New Accord”.  
  While the Reserve Bank agreed with the view that the focus of The New 
Basel Capital Accord might be primarily on internationally active banks, it contended 
that after a period of time, all “significant” banks would be expected to adhere to it. 
It was, however, pointed out that the standardized approach might not suit the needs 
of the smaller banks. As a consequence, it suggested a simplified standardised 
approach for those banks that are not internationally active. Under this approach, 
standardized risk weights in the range of 0 per cent to 150 per cent on the basis of 
internal ratings of banks, could be assigned, subject to mapping of such ratings with 
the benchmark probability of default (PD) estimated by the supervisor on the basis 
of pooled data from select banks.
10 The RBI recognized that even this simplified 
                                                 
10 As a precursor, the RBI pointed out that internal rating systems of banks need to be substantially 
upgraded and strengthened, keeping in view the best practices and the standards prescribed by the 
Basel Committee for the IRB approach.   19
approach is likely to be more extensive and complex than the 1988 Accord, and 
hence the New Accord may be applied, in phases.
11 
  As far as the ambit of “internationally active banks” is concerned, RBI 
defined these as banks with cross-boarder business exceeding 20 or 25 per cent of 
their total business (RBI, 2003). ‘Significant banks’, on the other hand, have been 
defined as those banks with complex structures and whose market share in the total 
assets of the domestic banking system exceeds 1 per cent.  
  A basic point of difference between The New Basel Capital Accord and RBI 
lies in the relative role of supervisors vis-à-vis external rating agencies. The RBI in its 
comment categorically reiterated that the External Credit Assessment Institutions 
should not be assigned the direct responsibility for risk assessment of banking book 
assets. This was primarily to avoid the contagion effect in the eventuality of a 
financial crisis and the proprietary information that domestic rating agencies have 
regarding their domestic clients. Furthermore, RBI pointed out that unsolicited 
ratings by external agencies are generally superficial, and could lead to a potential 
trade-off between competition and quality in the rating industry. Consequently, it 
favoured   the view that preferential risk weights should be assigned only on the basis 
of solicited ratings. 
In a similar spirit, RBI pointed out that the risk weighting of the banks 
should be de-linked from the credit rating of the sovereign in which these banks are 
incorporated. After all, country risk and firm-specific risks could be independent. A 
related issue is the assigning of weights to sovereign claims. The RBI felt that the 
national supervisors should be given some discretion to assign lower risk weight in 
specific cases.  
  RBI proposed that while internationally active banks may be required to 
follow the IRB approach, a simplified standardized approach may be evolved for 
other banks, whereby standardized risk weights in the range of 20 per cent to 150 per 
cent could be assigned on the basis of internal ratings of banks. 
                                                 
11 Over the last several years, the Monetary and Credit Policy statements announced bi-annually by 
the Governor have been continuously sensitizing banks on the need to upgrade and improve their 
risk management and control systems in the move towards the new Accord.   20
As far as the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach is concerned, it was 
argued that the minimum standards set for the same are complex and beyond the 
reach of many banks. Instead, it suggested that a simplified standardized approach 
above might be evolved and applied to banks that are not internationally active. 
These banks may be allowed to use internal ratings for assigning preferential risk 
weights, on certain types of exposures, after validation of the internal ratings systems 
by national supervisors. In particular, it noted that the line of demarcation between 
the six broad classes of exposures (viz., corporate, sovereigns, banks, retail, project 
finance and equity) could often be quite indistinct. Therefore, without recognising 
the institutional framework and geographical spreads such segregation could pose 
serious implementation problems. Furthermore, the RBI felt that national 
supervisors might have discretion and flexibility in defining the exposure classes, viz., 
corporate, retail, sovereign, project finance, etc. 
  In sum, unless suitably modified, the adoption of the New Basel Capital 
Accord in its present format would result in a significant increase in the capital 
charge for banks, especially in emerging markets. Besides, The New Basel Capital 
Accord could enhance the minimum regulatory capital, especially for banks in the 
developing economies, due to a number of reasons like, (a) withdrawal of uniform 
risk weight of 0 per cent on all sovereign claims (OECD & non-OECD), (b) explicit 
capital charge, or (c) imposition of higher risk weights on claims on certain high-risk 
exposures like venture capital or private equity.  
Some recent developments in the run up to the New Basel Capital Accord 
deserve mention in this context. Subsequent to the publication of the compliance 
status with the Basel Core Principles, the RBI has taken several steps to implement 
certain important components of Basel Capital Accord. Illustratively, the Risk Based 
Supervision (RBS) process was effected from April 2003. With a view to assisting 
banks in setting up appropriate risk management framework, guidelines on credit risk 
management, market risk management and risk based internal audit were issued. In 
response to requests made by banks, the Risk Profile Template (RPT) for use in 
commercial banks was forwarded to them. Side by side, guidelines on country risk 
management and provisioning have been issued to banks. These guidelines require   21
banks to formulate appropriate, well-documented and clearly defined Country Risk 
Management (CRM) policies, with the approval of the respective Boards and address 
the issues of identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling country exposure 
risks. In tandem with these developments, the Third Pillar of Basel Capital Accord is 
being bolstered by broadening the range of disclosures that banks have to disclose as 
part of ‘Notes on Accounts’ to their balance sheet. 
With a view to ensuring migration to the new Accord in a non-disruptive 
manner, the Reserve Bank has adopted a consultative approach. A  Steering 
Committee comprising of senior officials from 14 banks (private, public and foreign) 
has been constituted where Indian Banks' Association is also represented. Keeping in 
view the Reserve Bank's goal to have consistency and harmony with international 
standards it has been decided that at a minimum, all banks in India will adopt 
Standardized Approach for credit risk and Basic Indicator Approach for operational 
risk with effect from March 31, 2007. After adequate skills are developed, both in 
banks and at supervisory levels, some banks may be allowed to migrate to IRB 
Approach after obtaining the specific approval of Reserve Bank. The RBI has 
released Draft Guidelines for implementation of the New Capital Adequacy 
Framework on February 15, 2005.  
  What are the implications for the New Capital Accord for India? Following 
Leeladhar (2005) one may discern the following broad implications.   
First, there is a strong possibility that the new Accord will lead to increased 
capital requirement in all banks across the board. Although capital requirement for 
credit risk may go down due to adoption of more risk sensitive models - such 
advantage will be more than offset by additional capital charge for operational risk 
and increased capital requirement for market risk. This could have profound 
implications for consolidation in the banking industry. 
Second, competition among banks for highly rated corporates needing lower 
amount of capital may exert pressure on interest spread. Further, huge 
implementation cost may also influence profitability for smaller banks adversely.   22
Third, the level of rating penetration in India is still very low.
12 Furthermore, 
rating being a lagging indicator of the credit risk, the agencies often have poor track 
record. There is a possibility of rating blackmail through unsolicited rating. Moreover 
rating in India is restricted to issues and not issuers. Rating of issuers would be a 
challenge in India for years to come. 
Fourth, competitive advantage of IRB approach may lead to domination of 
this approach among big banks. Banks adopting IRB approach will be more sensitive 
than those adopting standardized approach. This may result in high-risk assets 
flowing to banks on standardized approach, as they would require lesser capital for 
these assets than banks on IRB approach. Leeladhar (2005) rightly observed, “It is to 
be considered whether in our quest for perfect standards, we have lost the only 
universally accepted standard”. 
Fifth, absence of historical database is going to be an obstacle for 
computation of probability of default, loss given default, migration mapping and 
supervisory validation require creation of historical database, which is a time 
consuming process and may require initial support from the supervisor.  
Sixth, in case of unrated sovereigns, banks and corporates, the prescribed risk 
weight is 100%, whereas in case of those entities with lowest ratting, the risk weight 
is 150%. This may create incentive for the category of counterparties, which 
anticipate lower rating to remain unrated.  
Seventh, the New Basel Accord is going to implications for corporate 
Governance Issues.  The proposals of the new Accord underscore the interaction 
between sound risk management practices and corporate good governance. The 
bank’s board of directors has the responsibility for setting the basic tolerance levels 
for various types of risk. It should also ensure that management establishes a 
framework for assessing the risks, develop a system to relate risk to the bank’s capital 
levels and establish a method for monitoring compliance with internal policies.  
Eighth, the new Capital Accord may turn out to be disadvantage for Smaller 
Banks. For its complexity, implementation of the new Accord calls for revamping 
                                                 
12 Leeladhar (2005) reported a study revealing that in 1999, out of 9640 borrowers enjoying fund-
based working capital facilities from banks, only 300 were rated by major agencies.   23
the entire management information system and allocation of substantial resources. 
Therefore, it may be out of reach for many smaller banks.
13  
Ninth, The new Basel Capital Accord may create a rift between external and internal 
auditors. The working Group set up by the Basel Committee to look into 
implementational issues observed that supervisors may wish to involve third parties, 
such a external auditors, internal auditors and consultants to assist them in carrying 
out some of the duties under the new Accord. The precondition is that there should 
be a suitably developed national accounting and auditing standards and framework, 
which are in line with the best international practices. A minimum qualifying criteria 
for firms should be those that have a dedicated financial services or banking division 
that is properly researched and have proven ability to respond to training and 
upgrades required of its own staff to complete the tasks adequately. With the 
implementation of the new framework, internal auditors may become increasingly 
involved in various processes, including validation and of the accuracy of the data 
inputs, review of activities performed by credit functions and assessment of a bank’s 
capital assessment process. 
In the light of the above, the question remains: what are the regulatory and 
supervisory challenges envisaged by the RBI in the implementation of the new 
Accord. Udeshi (2004) sums up the position as under:  
•  India has three established rating agencies in which leading international 
credit rating agencies are stakeholders and also extend technical support. However, 
the level of rating penetration is not very significant as, so far, ratings are restricted to 
issues and not issuers. While the new Accord provides some scope to extend the 
rating of issues to issuers, this would only be an approximation and it would be 
necessary for the system to move to ratings of issuers. Encouraging ratings of issuers 
would be a challenge.  
•  The new Accord provides scope for the supervisor to prescribe higher than 
the minimum capital levels for banks for, among others, interest rate risk in the 
                                                 
13 As Moody’s Investors Services puts it, “It is unlikely that these banks will have the financial 
resources, intellectual capital, skills and large scale commitment that larger competitors have to 
build sophisticated systems to allocate regulatory capital optimally for both credit and operational 
risks.” 
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banking book and concentration of risks / risk exposures. As already stated, we in 
India have initiated supervisory capacity building to identify slackness and to assess / 
quantify the extent of additional capital which may be required to be maintained by 
such banks. The magnitude of this task to be completed by December 2006, when 
we in India have as many as 100 banks, is daunting.  
•  Cross border issues have been dealt with by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision recently. But, in India, foreign banks are statutorily required to maintain 
local capital and the following issues would therefore, require to be resolved.  
•  Whether the internal models approved by their head offices and 
home country supervisor adopted by the Indian branches of foreign 
banks need to be validated again by the Reserve Bank or whether the 
validation by the home country supervisor would be considered 
adequate?  
•  Whether the data history maintained and used by the bank should be 
distinct for the Indian branches compared to the global data 
maintained and used by the head office?  
•  Whether capital for operational risk should be maintained separately 
for the Indian branches in India or whether it may be maintained 
abroad at head office?  
•  Whether these banks can be mandated to maintain capital as per SA 
/ BIA approaches in India irrespective of the approaches adopted by 
the head office?  
The new Accord could actually imply that the minimum requirements could become 
pro-cyclical. No doubt prudent risk management policies and Pillars II and III would 
help in overall stability. We feel that it would be preferable to have consistent 
prudential norms in good and bad times rather than calibrate prudential norms to 
counter pro-cyclicality.  
The existence of large and complex financial conglomerates could potentially pose a 
systemic risk and it would be necessary to put in place supervisory policies to address 
this.    25
In the event of some banks adopting IRB Approach, while other banks adopt 
Standardised Approach, the following profiles may emerge:  
•  Banks adopting IRB Approach will be much more risk sensitive than the 
banks on Standardised Approach, since even a small change in degree of risk 
might translate into a large impact on additional capital requirement for the 
IRB banks. Hence IRB banks could avoid assuming high risk exposures. 
Since banks adopting Standardised Approach are not equally risk sensitive 
and since the relative capital requirement would be less for the same 
exposure, the banks on Standardised Approach could be inclined to assume 
exposures to high risk clients, which were not financed by IRB banks. As a 
result, high risk assets could flow towards banks on Standardised Approach 
which need to maintain lower capital on these assets than the banks on IRB 
Approach.  
•  Similarly, low risk assets would tend to get concentrated with IRB banks 
which need to maintain lower capital on these assets than the Standardised 
Approach banks.  
•  Hence, system as a whole may maintain lower capital than warranted.  
•  Due to concentration of higher risks, Standardised Approach banks can 
become vulnerable at times of economic downturns. 
4.   Capital Adequacy and Bank Behaviour: An Empirical Exercise 
Absence of historical data does not allow us to have full-fledged quantitative 
impact of the new Capital Accord on India. Nevertheless, with a view to assess the 
impact of capital requirements on the Indian banking system, we develop an 
econometric model in this section. Before embarking on the empirical model, we 
provide some evidence as regards the behaviour of capital ratios and their asset 
profile over the sample period. The average capitalisation position of state-owned 
banks over the sample period increased from 8.72 per cent to 13.20 per cent with a 
concomitant lowering in the number of banks not complying with the stipulated 
ratios (RBI, 2004). The asset profile of state-owned banks reveals that the growth in 
loans virtually coincided with the growth in asset with investments witnessing a 
higher growth rate over the sample period (Table 2).    26
Table 2: Asset Profile and Capitalisation of Public Banks-1996 to 2004 
                                                                                          (Amount in Rs. crore) 




1995-96 5,05,845  2,07,539 1,62,667 1,12,705 (69.3)  8.72
1996-97 5,56,261  2,20,251 1,91,055 1,34,550 (70.4)  10.00
1997-98 6,49,186  2,59,903 2,27,103 1,55,772 (68.6)  11.53
1998-99 7,70,321  2,97,350 2,76,802 1,91,150 (69.1)  11.20
1999-00 8,90,952  3,52,109 3,33,414 2,37,825 (71.3)  10.66
2000-01 1,029,770  4,14,628 3,94,107 2,92,178 (74.1)  11.20
2001-02 1,155,737  4,80,680 4,54,008 3,44,690 (75.9)  11.80
2002-03 1,285,411  5,48,436 5,45,636 4,32,243 (79.2)  12.3
2003-04 1,471,428  6,32,740 6,25,678 5,10,232 (81.5)  13.2
Average Growth (%)*  5.96 6.24 7.59 8.54 
Stipulated CRAR was a minimum of 8 per cent upto end-March 1999 and 9 per cent, effective end-
March 2000. 
Figures in brackets indicate percentage to investments. 
*Compound growth rate over the sample period 
 
It can also be observed from the table that of the two major components of 
assets, viz., loans and investments, while loans have grown in tandem with asset 
growth, investments, and in particular, investments in Government securities has far 
outpaced overall asset growth with a consequent rise in its share in total investments 
over the period.   
The Model 
  Building on the work of Dietrich and James (1983) and earlier models and 
extending these to reflect recent capital adequacy developments, the following capital 
augmentation equation has been estimated: 
 
dKt/Kt= f (RoE, PK, LQ, KR, IRR, NPL, MQ, OBS)         (1) 
where,  
dKt/Kt   = Percentage growth in bank capital in a given year t;  
RoE  = Return on bank equity (proxy for the return on bank capital);  
PKt  = Ratio of government securities to total assets (measure of 
portfolio risk);  
LQt  = Ratio of banks’ cash in hand plus balances with RBI to total 
assets (liquidity indicator); 
KRt  = Basel (1988) type RAR of actual bank capital to computed 
regulatory required capital (measure of bank CAR compliance);   27
IRRt  = Ratio of interest sensitive assets to interest sensitive liabilities 
(measure of interest rate risk);
14 
NPLt  = Ratio of gross non-performing loans to gross advances (measure 
of credit risk); 
MQt  = Ratio of bank’s earning assets (i.e., loans plus marked to market 
portion of investments) to total assets (measure of bank’s 
managerial quality); 
OBSt  = Ratio of off-balance sheet business to total assets (proxy for 
innovation by management); 
 
  The dependent variable (dK/K) and the largest group of independent 
variables (RoE, PK, LQ, KR and NPL) are similar to those employed by previous 
researchers.  
The first bank-specific characteristic focuses on changes in capital 
determined by its cost. The cost of capital is measured by the return on equity (RoE). 
According to theory, higher the cost of capital, the more expensive capital 
augmentation and ceteris paribus, the lower the change in CAR. One potential problem 
is the possibility of a different relationship between RoE and capital augmentation. 
Berger (1995), in a different setting, argues that either a positive or negative 
relationship between RoE and the bank’s capital-asset ratio (and, therefore, 
presumably, capital augmentation) can be defended on a priori grounds. 
PK is a proxy for bank portfolio diversification risk; which is expected to be 
negatively related to changes in capital: the lower a bank’s portfolio risk (i.e., higher 
PK), the less is the need to augment capital.  
LQ is a liquidity variable; although Mayne (1972) employed a similar control 
variable; other researchers like Mingo (1975) and Dietrich and James (1983) did not. 
In essence, LQ is another key banking risk not factored explicitly into the regulatory 
capital adequacy formula. Intuitively, LQ is expected to be negatively related to 
changes in capital: the more liquid ((i.e., higher LQ) the bank, the lower the need to 
augment capital. 
                                                 
14 This variable has been calculated as [(1-proportion of non performing loans)*Loans/Deposits]. 
Investment portfolio, which is subject to a market risk, has been ignored in the calculations.    28
The relationship between KR and dK is the primary focus of the study. KR 
is the ratio of a bank’s actual capital adequacy in each year to the regulatory 
prescribed capital ratio. In other words, KR is constructed as a close approximation 
to the Basel-type RAR formula: it corresponds closely to Peltzman (1970) 
specification. If regulation is effective, the expected sign of KR is positive.
15 
NPL is an accounting measure of credit risk. It can be argued that a bank 
with a high NPL will be incentivised to improve its capital augmentation, since 
downside credit risk potential (i.e., unforeseeable and unforeseen credit losses) may 
be correlated with a high NPL. As a consequence, the NPL variable can be expected 
to be positively related to changes in capital augmentation changes. 
The next group of independent variables (IRR, MQ and OBS) are additional 
control variables employed within the current exercise. IRR is a rough measure of a 
bank’s interest rate gap and is expected to be positively related to capital 
augmentation. The higher IRR, the greater the incentive for a bank to increase its 
capital. 
MQ is a proxy for the managerial quality of the bank: higher the MQ, the 
better is bank management’s assumed quality (i.e., managerial skills) since 
management is able to operate with a higher level of earning assets. The better these 
managerial skills, the lower is the assumed pressure to augment capital; consequently, 
MQ is expected to have a negative sign. 
OBS proxies for management’s innovation skills; higher the OBS, the more 
innovatory the management is assumed to be. As with managerial skills, the pressure 
for capital augmentation are assumed to be less pressing for a more innovative bank 
management, which would imply an expected negative sign for OBS.  
  In addition, the capital regulation was tightened in 2001. Illustratively, with 
effect from April 2000, banks had to comply with a revised (minimum) capital 
adequacy stipulation of 9 per cent, from the earlier 8 per cent. Accordingly, a dummy 
variable was inserted for the year 2001 (DUM_2001) to ascertain whether the 
                                                 
15 Dietrich and James (1983) defined the KR variable as a negative inverse in order to permit a non-
linear response to regulatory pressure.  We sidestep such complications for the present exercise.    29
tightening of capital adequacy norms had any impact on bank capital augmentation 
process.  
Empirical Results  
Table 3 reports the regression results; the panel results for the entire period is 
exhibited as Model 1. First, it is observed that capital augmentation increases 
significantly following a rise in the return on equity. This suggests that state-owned 
banks use profits partially to augment their capital, because the return on equity is 
not only a proxy for capital cost, but also for bank profitability and retained earnings 
can be used for capital augmentation. Second, the sign on LQ is positive and sign, 
suggesting that liquidity is not a constraint for state-owned banks.  
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression Results on Capital Augmentation 
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3






















































Adjusted R-square  0.16 0.17 0.18
Time period  1996-2004 1996-2004 1996-2004
Hausman test 
Ho:RE vs FE 
60.5 58.3 50.2
Note:   (1) Standard errors are in brackets.  
  (2) *, *, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Of particular interest from the point of view of the present exercise is the 
sign on the KR variable, the proxy measure of bank capital adequacy compliance.   30
KR turned out to be significant at conventional levels, and it had its predicted sign 
over the sample period, supporting the efficacy of the regulatory process. When the 
model was augmented to include the non-performing loans as an additional 
explanatory variable (Model 2), this variable turned out to be significant, although the 
KR variable turned insignificant at conventional levels. Finally, in the fully expanded 
version of the model, when we incorporated the dummy variable (DUM_2001), KR 
turned out to be positive and statistically significant. These results support the view 
that CAR was effective. Regulatory pressure for improved capital adequacy is 
reflected in increased bank capital augmentation: the full panel results support this 
contention.  
 
It needs to be observed that the aforesaid analysis has been conducted in terms of 
Basel-I- type approach. While it doesn’t throw much light on the possible impact of 
the New Basel Capital Accord, it does highlight the importance of bank-specific 
factors in influencing capital ratios of banks and significance of regulatory 
compliance by banks. Judged thus, the analysis points to two important policy 
aspects. Firstly, capital ratios seem to have an influence on bank’s decision-making. 
This fact assumes all the more relevance in view of the growing concerns about 
banking stability. Secondly, banks would need to rethink their strategy of investment 
banking, as had happened during some part of this period. These observations gain 
prominence in view of the fact that the economy seems to have entered a high 
growth trajectory, which would necessitate a higher demand for loans. Combining 
the two aforesaid points, it seems fair to state that the Indian evidence makes capital 
requirements an attractive regulatory instrument: enhancing regulatory compliance 
while serving to reinforce the stability of the banking system. 
 
6. Emerging  Concerns 
Bank capital is directed at the risk of unexpected losses. In principle, all 
categories of banking risk that can lead to such losses needs to be covered by capital, 
and any of them, if left unattended, are capable of eroding the capital base of the 
institution. Those concerned with the management of banks are inevitably   31
confronted with the interrelationships among different categories of banking risks. 
Banks’ internal controls reflect awareness of this and are designed to deal with the 
problems which these inter-linkages pose. Recent periods of financial turbulence 
have brought forth the connections between different categories of banking risks, in 
particular, between credit and market risks. These connections have been highlighted 
in academic as well as policy publications.  
Not surprisingly, the efforts of major banks to upgrade their risk 
management function in response to the increased complexities of banking business 
are characterised by an increasingly integrated approach to risk management. While 
there are certain nitty-gritties that still need to be tackled as far as the robustness of 
these new methods and their ability to predict financial vulnerability are concerned, 
one might envision further improvements in this area in the near future. Moreover, 
in various forms, these methods are likely to spread from the larger, more 
sophisticated institutions to the less-complex rungs of the industry. 
The increasingly heterogeneous banking sector with which the BIS is 
concerned is a source of growing difficulty for global standard-setting, since the 
objectives of the BIS include a reasonable measure of regulatory uniformity for the 
institutions covered and thus the reduction in differing competitive advantages 
accruing from differences in national regulatory regimes. Efforts at harmonisation o 
banking regulation and supervision have, therefore, been rendered overtly complex 
by the diverse range of practices in loan classification and provisioning, differences 
in the legal and institutional frameworks and the varied accounting standards and 
fiscal regimes to which banks are subject to in different countries. One basic duality 
is the broad division of the international banking system into those banks, which 
have been following such standards (and thus, those which conform to ‘international 
best practice’) and those that have only recently begun aspiring towards such 
standards. This duality has, in its wake, led to the call for development of differential 
standards for sophisticated and less sophisticated banks, for internationally active 
and domestically active banks and as a corollary, to banks in developed and 
developing/emerging/transition economies. Mention may be made that the 
forerunner of banking standards, the 1988 Accord made a distinction between 
internationally active banks and other banks, while the New Basel Capital Accord   32
speaks, in addition, of a class of sophisticated banks to which international standards 
could be applicable (Narain and Ghosh, 2002). 
Second, the progressive shift in the nature of banking supervision sway from 
reliance on relatively simple rules and procedures is placing greater demand on 
supervisors, and in particular, on quantitative skills. The trend is already widespread 
and likely to gain momentum in the near future. While not all countries will be 
affected uniformly by these changes, emerging markets with developing banking 
sectors are likely to be significantly affected, as supervisory skills begin to command 
a premium. This might engender a migration of supervisory resources to places 
where it receives the highest remuneration.  
Does this mean that banks from developing countries are likely to be put at a 
further competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis large, internationally active banks from the 
industrialised world? Several commentators have been skeptical of the efficacy of the 
New Basel Capital Accord to strengthen banks in emerging countries (Rojas-Suarez, 
2001; Ward, 2002). Their argument is based on the premise that such countries can 
be divided into two groups according to their capacity to enforce regulatory capital: 
(a) those with inappropriate accounting standards and reporting systems and (b) 
those with high concentration of asset ownership, that allows a degree of 
maneuverability for market-based financing. Under such circumstances, capital ratios 
cease to play their desired role since there exists no capital markets to validate the 
“real” value of capital, as distinct from its accounting value. However, it seems fair to 
say that an answer to this question at the present juncture can, at best, be tentative. 
First, the existing proposals of New Basel Accord are still in the process of being 
actually implemented: different countries might face different constraints in 
implementing them. Secondly, and more fundamentally, in so far as the proposals are 
applicable to internationally active banks and to the extent such banks are less 
dominant in developing country markets, developing countries and emerging 
markets are possibly likely to be less affected by the New Basel Capital Accord.  
In India, the most important facet of risk, or for that matter, in most 
emerging markets, remain credit risk. Banks in India have typically had their 
operations centred on their branches. The system had historical appeal, given the 
wide branch network and the absence of technology networking. In the deregulated   33
environment, the system has become of limited relevance, since it squarely places the 
responsibility on the branch manager for both marketing (employer of capital) and 
credit functions (protector of capital), which could engender potential conflicts of 
interests. What is important is to ensure consistency of risk grading system across the 
entire organization and ensure that such policies are consistently applied across all 
geographical areas. The envisaged introduction of ‘core banking’ solutions would 
enable banks to segregate the credit sourcing (front office) and appraisal (back office) 
functions, which can, over time, build up expertise and monitor credit migrations on 
a bank-wide basis, a key factor behind the application of the new Accord (Nachane et 
al, 2005). The use of dynamic credit scoring models coupled with the full-fledged 
operationalisation of the credit bureau would enable banks to switch from traditional 
proprietary models to newer methods of credit evaluation to reflect the repayment 
and recovery experience across asset class, geographies and demographics. The 
improvements in the legal framework and the secular decline in distressed assets 
point to an improvement in the recovery climate, although it may be a while before 
the market for such distressed assets fully takes shape.  
The Basel Committee has recently come out with the final version of the 
Document which provides the roadmap for countries seeking to align their 
regulatory capital with the revised standards.
16 While the RBI has clarified its position 
on the new Accord, there is much work clearly ahead for banks, including evaluating 
their own readiness, training supervisory staff and more importantly, estimate their 
own abilities to identify, measure and manage their risks. A crucial feature of the new 
Accord is to enable banks to ‘unbundle’ different kinds of risks so that they can 
differentiate between, and manage separately, their exposures to credit, market and 
operational risks. It is, therefore, opportune that banks focus their attention on the 
role of capital, capital levels and targets and how they relate to strategic plans and 
objectives. Although the capitalisation position of Indian banks at end-March 2004 
at 13 per cent was well above the stipulated minimum levels, clearly there is little 
headroom for complacency. Banks would also need to spend more time assessing 
their own risk profiles and evaluating the amount of capital they need to cope with 
                                                 
16 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
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adverse outcomes in normal times and under reasonable stress scenarios. A Steering 
Committee has been constituted drawing upon members from banks, IBA and our 
own staff. The Steering Committee would constitute sub-groups which would 
provide inputs for preparing draft guidelines for implementation of Basel Capital 
Accord norms. Keeping in view the limited headroom available to banks to fund 
long-term projects, the RBI has recently allowed banks to raise long-term bonds for 
funding their long-term commitments.   
Capital is the basic pillar of strength for banks against unforeseen losses. 
Recognising this, the Basel Committee has brought out a document that clearly 
serves to promote greater international convergence in capital standards as also 
incentivise banks to hold regulatory capital aligned closely with their economic 
capital. However, it needs to be recognised that banking regulation and supervision 
are extremely complex areas where the regulator has to tread a careful middle path 
between the ex-cathedra  overzeal for intervention and a complacent belief in the 
ability of the banking system to self-rectify its deficiencies. As Caprio and Honohan 
(1999) remind us, in a recent contribution, ’bank regulation must be seen as a 
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